Gillai B., Rammohan S.V., Lee, H. L. 2014. Similarities in supply chain sustainability and intellectual property management. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. In the range of products that could benefit from the provision of TRIPS, scientific attention has focused heavily on externally influenced products, such as access to medicines and climate change technologies, for which the largest transit monopoly has been made possible, to the obvious detriment of many poor nations and poor consumers in rich countries. However, the ON TRIPS agreement was adopted before the effects of emerging new ICTs were fully discernible. As a result, the ICT sectors themselves and the global ICT value chains have faced serious governance problems, marked by uncertainty in intellectual property rights, and in some cases have been governed by sectoral innovations in IPR governance. Drahos, 1997. Strategic thinking on intellectual property rights.
Telecommunications policy, 21 (3): 201-211. The debate over the three levers leads to the conclusion that countries` IP systems offer “stronger” protection if they allow for the patentability of more knowledge, which is less exempt from the private exclusion rights of owners and maintains it for longer. In fact, we could at least use these dimensions in theory (subject to data restrictions) to compare the strength of patent systems in all countries across time and space.8 Watal J., Taubam, A. (Eds). 2015. The drafting of the agreement ON THE TRIPS: personal lessons learned from the Uruguay Round negotiations. Geneva: WTO. Brander, J. A., Cui, V., Vertinsky, I.
2017. China and intellectual property rights: a challenge for the rule of law. Journal of International Business Studies, 48 (7): 908-921. In general, these findings on the IP chapters of the TAPs coincide with Gamso and Grosse (2020). They note that extensive NTPs, such as investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and property rights protection, provide particularly important signals for investors in countries with low property rights, as additional protections afforded by a deeper agreement may replace those lacking at the national level. Empirically, they note that the depth of the PTA is positively associated with the direct objectives i% between member countries, but the association is weakening due to the strength of property rights in the host countries. That is why they conclude that governments can attract higher levels of ANT through comprehensive trade agreements, unlike flat NTPs, if domestic policy is not sufficient. However, flat agreements are sufficient where domestic policy already protects property rights.
A second lever is the exemption from patent rights. Intellectual property based on non-competing materials is generally allowed to give consumers and other producers, beyond the owners (i.e. “third parties”), more rights to the exploitation of private knowledge than in the case of ordinary property. Patent systems will always have provisions defining and delimiting these rights. Some of these are defined as automatic exceptions that do not depend on the authorization of the rights holder or the state, such as the use .B of research products or the preparation of products for marketing after the patent expires.